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Abstract
Classical studies of asymmetric information focus on situations where only one side
of a market is informed. This study experimentally investigates a more general case
where some sellers are informed and some buyers are informed. We establish the exis-
tence of semi-separating perfect Bayesian equilibria where prices serve as informative
signals of quality to uninformed buyers, while informed buyers can often leverage their
informational advantage by purchasing high quality items from uninformed sellers at
bargain prices. These models provide a rational foundation for the co-existence of
bargains, price signaling, and Pareto efficiency in markets with asymmetric informa-
tion. We test these theoretical predictions in a controlled laboratory experiment where
agents repeatedly participate in markets with asymmetric information. We observe
long run behavior consistent with equilibrium predictions of price signaling, bargains,
and partial-pooling behavior.
∗We thank George Akerlof, Manel Baucells, the seminar participants at the Darden School of Business,
and the conference participants at the 2019 ESA North America meetings for their insightful comments on
this paper.
1 Introduction
Economic models frequently assume that consumers and producers have perfect information
about the quality of items in the marketplace. In contrast to this assumption, more recent
work considers the case of asymmetric information where some agents have more information
than others. Marketplaces such as Amazon, AbeBooks, eBay, flea markets, and trade shows
are often characterized by significant uncertainty regarding the quality of the goods available
for sale.
Akerlof (1970) considers an information structure in which all sellers are informed about
the quality of the items they offer but all buyers are uninformed about the quality of the
items they are offered. Here buyers can only observe the average quality of items in the
marketplace. Akerlof’s classic analysis derived the implication that markets will unravel
such that higher quality items will disappear from the marketplace leaving only ‘lemons’ for
sale.
Casual observation suggests that some consumers can find bargains by purchasing high
quality items at unusually low prices. One hears of people who find valuable paintings at
a flea market or who find rare first editions at a library book sale. Some consumers go to
these venues primarily to look for such ‘good deals.’ These types of bargains are difficult to
rationalize in Akerlof’s setting since only lemons are available for sale in equilibrium.
Like Akerlof (1970), Bagwell and Riordan (1991), and Janssen and Roy (2010), we adopt
a setting with binary quality. In our setting, some sellers are uninformed such that they
cannot distinguish high quality items from low quality items. In such markets, experienced
collectors and connoisseurs may have detailed knowledge of the items they collect, allowing
them to take advantage of underpriced items sold by uninformed sellers.
The possibility that some sellers are uninformed is especially plausible in markets where
evaluating goods requires some expertise or where there is a cost to becoming informed.
Valuation of artwork, collectibles, or antiques often requires expertise. Researchers at eBay
Research Labs (Hu and Bolivar (2008)) found that the average consumer surplus ratio in
eBay auctions for items in the collectibles category is approximately 40% and that for certain
subcategories such as Pre-1940 photographic image collectibles, the median consumer surplus
ratio was over 50%. If sellers were informed about the value of their items, they could have
extracted a higher profit from setting a higher reserve price or opening bid. In contrast,
iPhones, which are easier to value, were found to yield a consumer surplus ratio of 1.59%.
Sellers with large inventories may also be uninformed about the value of individual items
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and may find it prohibitively costly to examine and value each item. For instance, a seller
with an inventory of thousands of used books may believe that some of the books could
be valuable first editions, but consider such books too rare to justify inspecting the entire
inventory. Even in markets where sellers are expected to be informed such as real estate
markets, recent studies find evidence that many sellers are uninformed about the energy
efficiency of their homes (Cassidy (2019); Myers et al. (2019)).
In practice, uninformed consumers often try to infer quality directly from the price of a
product. For example, wine consumers often assume that high quality products will be
offered at higher prices. The possibility that price might serve as an informative signal of
quality does not typically arise in neoclassical general equilibrium theory where item qualities
are commonly known, nor does it arise in Akerlof’s model where only low-quality items are
available for sale in equilibrium.
Previous work has considered special cases where some buyers are informed or some sellers
are informed. Prior work by Salop and Stiglitz (1977) studied markets with bargains and
ripoffs but made the strong assumption that all items in the market have the same quality.
Their model does not address the problem of adverse selection that is central to Akerlof’s
analysis.
Subsequent work by Chan and Leland (1982), Wolinsky (1983), and Cooper and Ross (1984)
showed that price signaling can arise in equilibrium if some buyers are informed and firms
can choose the quality level they produce. Bagwell and Riordan (1991) and Janssen and Roy
(2010) demonstrate that price can also signal quality when a firm’s level of quality is given
and all sellers are informed. Kessler (2001) considers a perfectly competitive market where
some sellers are uninformed, all buyers are uninformed, and all agents act as price-takers.
Dari-Mattiacci et al. (2011) analyze markets where all buyers are informed and all sellers
are uninformed. They find ‘inverse adverse selection’ in which the market disappears from
the bottom rather than from the top.
Nearly five decades later, the strategic analysis of markets with asymmetric information
remains incomplete. The previous literature has surprisingly not considered the case where
there are both informed and uninformed agents on each side of the market. Here we study
this more general case in a non-cooperative signaling game in which sellers strategically
choose prices, and buyers endogenously form beliefs. In this paper, we prove the existence
of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria where uninformed sellers either pool with informed high
quality sellers or informed low quality sellers.
To test these theoretical predictions, we conduct laboratory experiments where heterogeneous
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buyers and sellers repeatedly participate in a market for goods with heterogeneous quality.
Consistent with the equilibrium predictions, we find evidence of both bargains and price-
signaling behavior. We also find evidence consistent with the predicted pooling behavior of
uninformed sellers. Observed behavior is well-explained by a noisy best-response model that
closely approximates the equilibrium predictions.
We characterize two types of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria: low price equilibria, where
uninformed sellers charge low prices, leading to Pareto efficient full trade; and high-price
equilibria, where uninformed sellers charge high prices. If enough items are low quality,
uninformed sellers are better off charging low prices. In this case, high prices are informative
signals of high quality since only informed high quality sellers post them. Thus, uninformed
buyers will be willing to purchase items with high prices. This case forms the basis for our
low price equilibrium.
Conversely, if enough buyers are informed, uninformed sellers should primarily respond to
informed buyers. If enough items are high quality, uninformed sellers are better off charging
high prices. In this case, high prices are not reliable signals of high quality. Hence uninformed
buyers will not be willing to pay high prices. This case forms the basis for our high price
equilibrium.
In the low price equilibrium, informed buyers can purchase high quality items from unin-
formed sellers at bargain prices. These bargains are rare because most items are low quality.
This is why uninformed sellers are better off setting a low price and selling to everyone rather
than setting a high price and only selling to informed buyers if their item is high quality.
So, in equilibrium, bargains can only occur when they are sufficiently rare. This mirrors a
feature of bargains in real markets where informed consumers search through large numbers
of low quality offers in hopes of finding a high quality item at a low price.
Our experiment consists of two treatments. Adaptive dynamics predict convergence to low
price equilibria in our first treatment. Conversely, adaptive dynamics predict convergence
to high price equilibria in our second treatment. The observed behavior supports these
qualitative predictions: In the first treatment, uninformed sellers largely pooled with low
quality informed sellers. In the second treatment uninformed sellers largely pooled with
high quality informed sellers.
While subject behavior was largely consistent with these pooling predictions, it systemati-
cally deviated from equilibrium predictions in terms of the transaction rate and the bargain
rate. Equilibrium predicts full trade in our first treatment but low levels of trade in our
second treatment. While the first treatment exhibited significantly higher empirical trans-
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action rates, it remained significantly below equilibrium predictions. Equilibrium predicts
that uninformed sellers will always offer bargains in our first treatment but will never offer
bargains in our second treatments. While the first treatment exhibited significantly higher
empirical bargain rates, it remained significantly below equilibrium predictions.
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section 2 formally introduces the signaling
game and derives equilibrium predictions. Section 3 describes the experimental design and
procedures. Section 4 identifies the hypotheses to be tested. Section 5 presents the results
and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are included in Appendix A.
2 Theory
Consider the following interaction between a buyer and a seller. The seller possesses an item
which she values at q ∈ Q = {q, q̄} such that q < q̄ ∈ R+. With probability θ, the item is low
quality (q = q). With probability 1 − θ, the item is high quality (q = q̄). With probability
λ ∈ (0, 1), the seller is uninformed about the quality of the item. With probability 1 − λ,
the seller is informed about the quality of the item. Let Is denote the seller’s information
level such that Is = 1 if the seller is informed and Is = 0 if the seller is uninformed.
The buyer values the seller’s item at kq such that k > 1. With probability γ ∈ (0, 1), the
buyer is uninformed about the quality of the item. With probability 1 − γ the buyer is
informed about the quality of the item. Let Ib denote the buyer’s information level such that
Ib = 1 if the buyer is informed and Ib = 0 if the buyer is uninformed. The seller chooses
a posted price p ∈ R+ for the item. After observing the posted price, the buyer decides
whether to purchase the item. Let B = 1 if the buyer decides to purchase the item and
B = 0 if the buyer decides not to purchase the item.
2.1 Strategies
Let Ω denote the state space such that
Ω =
{
(q, Ib, Is) : q ∈
{
q̄, q
}
, Ib, Is ∈ {0, 1}
}
(1)
We say that an uninformed seller has type Us. We say that an informed seller with a high
quality item has type Hs. We say that an informed seller with a low quality item has type
Ls. Let Ts = {Hs, Us, Ls} denote the seller’s type set. The seller’s type ts ∈ Ts is given by
4
τs : Ω→ Ts such that
τs (ω) =

Us if Is = 0
Hs if Is = 1 and q = q̄
Ls if Is = 1 and q = q
(2)
The seller’s strategy is given by ρ : Ts → R+ such that p = ρ (ts). That is, the seller’s
strategy specifies her posted price as a function of her type.
We say that an uninformed buyer has type Ub. We say that an informed buyer considering a
high quality item has type Hb. We say that an informed buyer considering a low quality item
has type Lb. Let Tb = {Hb, Ub, Lb} denote the buyer’s type set. The buyer’s type tb ∈ Tb is
given by τb : Ω→ Tb such that
τb (ω) =

Ub if Ib = 0
Hb if Ib = 1 and q = q̄
Lb if Ib = 1 and q = q
(3)
The buyer’s strategy is given by β : Tb × R+ → {0, 1} such that
B = β (tb, p) (4)
That is, the buyer’s strategy specifies whether or not she will buy an item as a function of
her type and the posted price of the item. In some cases, the buyer’s strategy may take the
form of a reservation price R : Tb → R+ such that
β (tb, p) =
1 p ≤ R (τb)0 p > R (τb) (5)
2.2 Expected Payoffs
If the buyer decides to purchase the item then she pays the posted price to the seller and
receives the item from the seller. Let πb denote the buyer’s payoff and πs denote the seller’s
payoff such that
πb = β (τb, p) (kq − p) (6)
πs = β (τb, p) (p− q) (7)
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Since k > 1, there are always gains from trade. An informed seller with a high quality item
knows that an informed buyer must also observe high quality. Conversely an informed buyer
considering a high quality item knows that an informed seller must also observe high quality.
Let T denote the feasible type space such that
T = Tb × Ts \ {(Hb, Ls) , (Lb, Hs)}
Here, T denotes all possible type profiles such that informed agents agree about the quality
of the item. The conditional distribution of the buyer’s type tb given the seller’s type ts is
P (tb|ts) tb = Hb tb = Ub tb = Lb
ts = Hs 1− γ γ 0
ts = Us (1− θ) (1− γ) γ θ (1− γ)
ts = Ls 0 γ 1− γ
Let qU denote the unconditional expected quality (qU = θq + (1− θ) q̄). In contrast, the
conditional expected quality of the item given the type profile t = (tb, ts) ∈ T is
E {q|tb, ts} =

q̄ if tb = Hb or ts = Hs
qU if tb = Ub and ts = Us
q if tb = Lb or ts = Ls
(8)
Hence, the seller’s conditional expected payoff given her type ts and her posted price p is
E {πs|ts, p} =
∑
tb∈Tb
P (tb|ts) β (tb, p) (p− E {q|tb, ts}) (9)
Let µ (q|p, tb) denote the buyer’s posterior belief regarding the quality of the item conditional
on her type tb and the posted price p. The conditional expected quality given the buyer’s
type and the posted price of the item is
Eµ {q|tb, p} = µ (q̄|p, tb) q̄ + µ
(
q|p, tb
)
q (10)
The buyer’s expected payoff conditional on her type tb, the posted price p, and her purchasing
decision B ∈ {0, 1} is given by
Eµ {πb|tb, p, B} = (kEµ {q|tb, p} − p)B (11)
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2.3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
The conditional probability of observing a posted price p given the seller’s type ts is given
by
P (p|τs) =
1 if p = ρ (τs)0 otherwise (12)
Hence the unconditional probability of observing a posted price p is given by
P (p) = λP (p|Us) + θ (1− λ)P (p|Ls) + (1− θ) (1− λ)P (p|Hs) (13)
The conditional probability of observing a posted price p given the item’s quality q is
P (p|q) =
λP (p|Us) + (1− λ)P (p|Ls) if q = qλP (p|Us) + (1− λ)P (p|Hs) if q = q̄ (14)
Now if P (p) > 0 then Bayes’ rule implies that
P
(
q|p
)
=
P
(
q
)
P
(
p|q
)
P (p)
=
θP
(
p|q
)
P (p)
Hence the buyer’s belief µ is consistent along the path of play if
µ
(
q|p, tb
)
=

1 if tb = Lb
0 if tb = Hb
P
(
q|p
)
if tb = Ub and P (p) > 0
(15)
Equation (15) simply states that the buyer believes the item is low quality if she knows that
it is low quality, she believes that it is high quality if she knows it is high quality, and she
uses Bayes’ rule when possible. A strategy profile (ρ, β) and a consistent belief µ form a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium if
ρ (ts) ∈ argmax
p∈R+
E {πs|ts, p} for ts ∈ Ts
β (tb, p) ∈ argmax
B∈{0,1}
Eµ {πb|tb, p, B} for (tb, p) ∈ Ts × R+
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2.3.1 No Trade Equilibria
If the seller’s price is always greater than the buyer’s value for a high quality item then the
buyer might as well refuse to even consider the item. On the other hand, if the buyer refuses
to even consider the item, then the seller might as well post a very high price. Formally, if
ρ (ts) ≥ kq̄ for all ts ∈ Ts then kEµ {q|tb, ρ (ts)} ≤ ρ (ts) for all (tb, ts) ∈ T . Conversely, if
β (tb, p) = 0 for all p ∈ R+ then E {πs|ts, p} = 0 for all (ts, p) ∈ Ts × R+. Hence there exists
a perfect Bayesian equilibrium under which a transaction never occurs as β (tb, ρ (ts)) = 0
for all (tb, ts) ∈ T .
2.3.2 Trade Equilibria
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (ρ, β) is said to be a trade equilibrium if
β (ρ (Ls) , Lb) = β (ρ (Hs) , Hb) = 1 (16)
In a trade equilibrium, (16) indicates that a transaction always takes place if the buyer
values the item more than the seller and the quality of the item is known to both parties.
Proposition 1 states that the uninformed seller pools with either the informed high quality
seller or the informed low quality seller in every trade equilibrium.
Proposition 1. If (ρ, β) is a trade equilibrium then ρ (Us) ∈ {ρ (Ls) , ρ (Hs)}.
2.3.3 Strategy Profiles
We say that a strategy profile (ρ, β) is of type 1 if
β (tb, p) =
1 p ≤ R (tb)0 p > R (tb) (17)
p = ρ (Ls) = ρ (Us) < ρ (Hs) = p̄ (18)
p = R (Lb) < R (Ub) = R (Hb) = p̄ (19)
Under a type 1 strategy profile, the seller posts a low price p if she is uninformed or she is
informed about a low quality item. She posts a high price p̄ if she is informed about a high
quality item. The buyer is willing to pay either price if she is uninformed or she is informed
about a high quality item. The buyer is willing to pay the low price p but not the high price
p̄ if she is informed about a low quality item.
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We say that a strategy profile (ρ, β) is of type 2 if
β (tb, p) =
1 p ≤ R (τb)0 p > R (τb) (20)
p = ρ (Ls) < ρ (Us) = ρ (Hs) = p̄ (21)
p = R (Lb) = R (Ub) < R (Hb) = p̄ (22)
Under a type 2 strategy profile, the seller posts a high price p̄ if she is uninformed or she is
informed about a high quality item. She posts a low price p if she is informed about a low
quality item. The buyer is willing to pay either price if she is informed about a high quality
item. The buyer is willing to pay the low price p but not the high price p̄ if she is informed
about a low quality item or if she is uninformed.
2.3.4 Low Price Equilibria
Proposition 2 states that a broad class of environments support low price equilibria with
type 1 strategy profiles. Equation (23) and equation (24) are the individual rationality
constraints that an informed buyer and an informed seller each guarantee themselves a non-
negative payoff. They also imply the possibility of gains from trade between the buyer and
the seller for both low quality items and high quality items. Equation (25) is the incentive
compatibility constraint that an informed seller with a low quality item is better off selling
at the low price with certainty than selling at the high price only if the buyer is uninformed.
Equation (26) is the incentive compatibility constraint that an uninformed seller is better off
selling at the low price with certainty than selling at the high price only if either the quality
is high and the buyer is informed or if the buyer is uninformed.
Proposition 2. If (ρ, β) is a type 1 strategy profile such that
q̄ ≤ p̄ ≤ kq̄ (23)
q ≤ p ≤ kq (24)
γ
(
p̄− q
)
≤ p− q (25)
(1− θ) (1− γ) (p̄− q̄) + γ (p̄− qU) ≤ p− qU (26)
then there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with a type 1 strategy profile.
Proof. See appendix on page 29.
Low price equilibria exhibit full trade as a transaction always takes place since β (tb, ρ (ts)) =
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1 for all (tb, ts) ∈ T , so the buyer is always willing to buy at the price the seller offers under
any possible type profile. These equilibria are said to exhibit price signaling as prices carry
informative signals about quality to uninformed buyers since E {q|p̄} > E{q|p}, so the
expected quality given a high price is higher than the expected quality given a low price.
Such equilibria support bargains since an uninformed seller sets a posted price below her
own value for a high quality item. In this case, an informed buyer may be able to obtain a
high quality item at a bargain price.
2.3.5 High Price Equilibria
Proposition 3 states that a broad class of environments support high price equilibria with
type 2 strategy profiles. Equation (27) implies the individual rationality constraints that an
informed buyer and an informed seller each guarantee themselves a non-negative payoff when
the item quality is high. Equation (28) implies the individual rationality constraints that an
informed buyer and an informed seller each guarantee themselves a non-negative payoff when
the item quality is low. It also implies that an informed high quality seller can never make a
profit by selling at the low price. Equation (29) implies that, in equilibrium, an uninformed
buyer is unwilling to pay the high price. Equation (30) implies that an uninformed seller
is better off selling at the high price only when the item quality is high and the buyer is
informed than selling at the low price with certainty.
Proposition 3. If (ρ, β) is a type 2 strategy profile such that
q̄ ≤ p̄ ≤ kq̄ (27)
q ≤ p ≤ kq ≤ q̄ (28)
k
(
θλq + (1− θ) q̄
)
≤ p̄ (θλ+ 1− θ) (29)
θ (1− γ)
(
p− q
)
+ γ
(
p− qU
)
≤ (1− θ) (1− γ) (p̄− q̄) (30)
then there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium with a type 2 strategy profile.
Proof. See appendix on page 30.
High price equilibria do not exhibit full trade as a transaction does not take place if an
uninformed buyer meets an uninformed seller since β (Ub, ρ (Us)) = 0. High price equilibria
exhibit price signaling as prices carry informative signals about quality to uninformed buyers
since E {q|p̄} > E{q|p}. High price equilibria do not support bargains since the buyer can
never purchase an item at a price below the seller’s own valuation for the item. Such
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equilibria are said to exhibit price signaling as informed sellers with low quality items set a
lower posted price than other sellers, so uninformed buyers can infer some information about
quality from observing posted prices.
2.4 Many Buyers and Sellers
Consider a market populated by n sellers of each type (high, low, and uninformed) and n
buyers of each type (high, low, and uninformed). Let ti ∈ Ts denote the type of seller i
and let tj ∈ Tb denote the type of buyer j. Let φ (q, ti, tj) denote the number of items with
quality q offered by a seller of type ti to a buyer of type tj. Buyers value items with quality
q at kq where k > 1. The number of low quality items offered by seller i to buyer j is given
by
tj
φ
(
q, ti, tj
)
Hb Ub Lb
Hs 0 0 0
ti Us 0 mθλγ mθλ (1− γ)
Ls 0 mθ (1− λ) γ mθ (1− λ) (1− γ)
where m ∈ N. The number of high quality items offered by seller i to buyer j is given by
ti
φ (q̄, ti, tj) Hb Ub Lb
Hs m (1− θ) (1− λ) (1− γ) m (1− θ)λ (1− γ) 0
tj Us m (1− θ)λ (1− γ) m (1− θ)λγ 0
Ls 0 0 0
Each seller i chooses a single posted price pi ∈ R+. After observing prices, buyer j decides
which items to purchase. Let Bij = 1 if buyer j purchases the items offered by seller
i. Otherwise, let Bij = 0. Buyer j’s strategy is given by βj : R+ → {0, 1} such that
Bij = βj (pi). The payoff to seller i is given by
ui (p, β) =
3n∑
j=1
∑
q∈Q
φ (q, ti, tj) βj (pi) (pi − q) (31)
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Here, the payoff of a seller who faces a population of buyers employing distinct pure strategies
is equivalent to the expected payoff of a seller who faces a single buyer employing a mixed
strategy. The payoff of buyer j is given by
uj (p, β) =
3n∑
i=1
∑
q∈Q
φ (q, ti, tj) βj (pi) (kq − pi) (32)
Here, the payoff of a buyer who faces a population of sellers employing distinct pure strategies
is equivalent to the expected payoff of a buyer who faces a single seller employing a mixed
strategy. Proposition 4 states that Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the two agent interaction
correspond with Nash equilibria of markets with many buyers and sellers.
Proposition 4. If (ρ0, β0, µ0) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the interaction between a
single buyer and a single seller then (p, β) such that pi = ρ0 (ti) and βj (x) = β0 (tj, x) for
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 3n} is a Nash equilibrium of the market with multiple buyers and sellers.
Proof. See appendix on page 31.
2.5 The Best Response Dynamic
Consider an environment where a population of buyers and a population of sellers repeatedly
interact as described in section 2.4. In every period, each seller i selects a posted price pi
and each buyer selects a reservation price Rj. Buyer j accepts offers with posted prices less
than or equal to her reservation price such that
βj (p) =
1 if p ≤ Rj0 if p > Rj
The best response dynamic is an adaptive model under which agents asynchronously switch
to myopic best responses. Let ηi ∈ [0, 1] denote the rate at which agent i adjusts her strategy.
If the current strategy profile is given by s = (s1, . . . , sn) then the probability that an agent
12
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i switches from her current strategy si to the alternate strategy s′i is given by
Pi (s′i|s) =
ηiai (s
′
i|s)∑
xi∈Si
ai (xi|s)
ai (xi|s) =

1 if xi ∈ argmax
yi∈Si
πi (yi, s−i)
0 otherwise
Figure 1 illustrates the mean price paths predicted by the best response dynamic for q = 3,
q̄ = 6, k = 2, θ = 7
8
, γ = 1
8
, λ = 1
2
. By proposition 2 these parameters are sufficient for a
low price equilibrium under which informed sellers with high quality items post a high price
p̄ ∈ [q̄, kq̄] while uninformed sellers and informed sellers with low quality items post a low
price p ∈
[
q, kq
]
. Consistent with these equilibrium predictions, the best response dynamic
predicts that uninformed sellers and informed sellers with low type items will post similar
prices.
Figure 2 illustrates the mean price paths predicted by the best response dynamic for q = 2,
q̄ = 8, k = 1.5, θ = 1
2
, γ = 1
2
, λ = 1
2
. By proposition 3 these parameters are sufficient for
the existence a high price equilibrium under which uninformed sellers and informed sellers
with high quality items post a high price p̄ ∈ [q̄, kq̄] while informed sellers with low quality
items post a low price p ∈
[
q, kq
]
. Consistent with these equilibrium predictions, the best
response dynamic predicts that uninformed sellers and informed sellers with high type items
will post similar prices.
2.6 Noisy Best Response Dynamics
The noisy best response dynamic is an adaptive model under which agents asynchronously
switch to noisy approximations of their myopic best responses. Let ηi ∈ [0, 1] denote the rate
at which agent i adjusts her strategy. Let αi denote agent i’s precision in selecting a best
response. Let βi denote agent i’s sensitivity to differences in the payoffs yielded by distinct
strategies. If the current strategy profile is given by s = (s1, . . . , sn) then the probability
that an agent i switches from her current strategy si to an alternate strategy s′i is given by
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Pi (s′i|s) =
ηi expui (s
′
i|s)∑
xi∈Si
expui (xi|s)
(33)
ui (xi|s) = αi min |xi −BRi (s)|+ βiπi (xi, s−i) (34)
BRi (s) = argmax
yi∈Si
πi (yi, s−i) (35)
Such agents may exhibit two distinct types of behavioral noise. The parameter αi indexes the
extent to which agent i exhibits an imprecise “trembling hand” such that she may not always
select a best response but she is more likely to select strategies that are near a best response.
The parameter βi indexes the extent to which agent i exhibits a logit quantal response such
that she may not always select a best response but she is more likely to select strategies that
yield higher payoffs. In the limit as αi → 0 and βi → 0 the noisy best response converges to
a pure noise uniform distribution. Conversely, in the limit as αi →∞ or βi →∞ the noisy
best response converges to the exact best response considered in 2.5.
In the absence of behavioral noise, exact selection of a best response and exact payoff max-
imization are equivalent. However, in the presence of behavioral noise these two models
can make different predictions. For example, relatively flat payoff functions where the best
response is only slightly more profitable than other strategies will lead to greater variation
in behavior when a subjects is more likely to select strategies with higher payoffs and she
exhibits imperfect sensitivity to payoff differences. In contrast, if a subject is simply more
likely to select strategies near her best response, then even if she exhibits imperfect precision
in her strategy selection, the shape of the payoff function away from the best response does
not affect her behavior.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
This study investigates markets with many buyers and sellers under two experimental treat-
ment conditions. Treatment 1 implements parameter values under which uninformed sellers
emulate informed sellers with low quality items in equilibrium as shown by proposition 2.
Treatment 2 implements parameter values under which uninformed sellers emulate informed
sellers with high quality items in equilibrium as shown by proposition 3. Table 1 presents
the parameter values implemented by each experimental treatment.
A total of ten experimental sessions were conducted, five for each of the two experimental
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Treatment 1 Treatment 2
High Quality (q̄) 6 8
Low Quality (q) 3 2
Gains From Trade (k) 2 3/2
Proportion Low Quality (θ) 7/8 1/2
Proportion Informed Buyers (γ) 1/8 1/2
Proportion Informed Sellers (λ) 1/2 1/2
Table 1: Experimental Treatments
treatment conditions. Each experimental session was conducted with 24 subjects, for a total
of 240 experimental subjects. The experimental design was between subjects such that each
session implemented only one treatment and each subject participated in only one session.
All ten sessions were conducted at the Chapman University Economic Science Institute
Laboratory.
During each session, 12 subjects took the role of buyers and 12 subjects took the role of
sellers. Each experimental session consisted of 100 periods, each of which implemented a
market with many buyers and many sellers as detailed in Section 2.4. During each period,
some sellers were informed about the quality of the items while others remained uninformed.
Similarly, some buyers were informed about the quality of the items they were offered while
others remained uninformed. During each period each seller selected a posted price for the
items they offered and each buyer selected a reservation price for the items they were offered.
At the end of each period transactions took place at the posted price whenever it was below
the corresponding reservation price.
Figure 3 depicts the experimental interface. Throughout each session, subjects could observe
the current period, their payoff from the previous period, their endowment, their valuations
for each type of item, the valuations of others, and their counterfactual payoffs from the
previous period. Sellers could observe the number of offers at each quality level they made
to each buyer. Buyers could observe the number of offers at each quality level they received
from each seller. Similar interfaces providing counterfactual payoffs have been employed in
the previous literature including Cason et al. (2013), Oprea et al. (2011), and Stephenson
(2019). At the end of each session, subjects received their average payoff over all periods
plus a seven dollar show up bonus with an average final payment of $18.59.
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Figure 3: Screenshot of the Experimental Interface.
4 Hypotheses
Proposition 2 provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a low price equilibrium where
uninformed sellers post the same low price as informed low quality sellers. These conditions
are satisfied by treatment 1 of the experimental design.
Hypothesis 1. Uninformed sellers will pool with low quality informed sellers under Treat-
ment 1.
Proposition 3 provides sufficient conditions for the existence of a high price equilibrium
where uninformed sellers post the same high price as informed high quality sellers. These
conditions are satisfied by treatment 2 of the experimental design.
Hypothesis 2. Uninformed sellers will pool with high quality informed sellers under treat-
ment 2.
Under both types of equilibria, uninformed buyers can make valid inferences from prices
about the quality of items they are offered. Under low price equilibria, uninformed buyers
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can reliably infer high quality from high prices. Under high price equilibria, uninformed
buyers can reliably infer low quality from low prices.
Hypothesis 3. Both treatments will exhibit significant price signaling.
Low price equilibria exhibit full trade as every possible interaction between a buyer and a
seller results in a transaction. In constrast, high price equilibria do not exhibit full trade
since neither uninformed buyers nor informed low quality buyers are willing to pay the prices
posted by uninformed sellers. Hence such interactions do not result in transactions under
high price equilibria.
Hypothesis 4. Treatment 1 will exhibit a significantly higher transaction rate than treatment
2.
In low price equilibria, informed buyers have an opportunity to find bargains where they
can purchase high quality items from uninformed sellers at prices that are lower than the
seller’s value for high quality items. Conversely, no such opportunities exist under high
price equilibria since uninformed sellers post prices that are greater than their value for high
quality items.
Hypothesis 5. Buyers will encounter significantly more bargains in treatment 1 than treat-
ment 2.
5 Results
Figure 4 illustrates the mean price paths observed under treatment 1 and Figure 5 illustrates
the mean price paths observed under treatment 2. In both figures, the horizontal axis
indicates periods ranging from 1 to 100 and the vertical axis indicates the mean posted price
over all of the sessions that implemented the respective experimental treatment. The green
line illustrates the prices posted by informed sellers with high quality items. The blue line
illustrates the prices posted by uninformed sellers. The red line illustrates the prices posted
by informed sellers with low quality items.
Result 1. The prices posted by uninformed sellers were similar to prices posted by low quality
informed sellers under treatment 1 and were similar to prices posted by high quality informed
sellers under treatment 2.
Consistent with equilibrium predictions, the prices posted by uninformed sellers in treatment
1 are closely aligned with the prices posted by low quality informed sellers while the prices
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Figure 4: Mean price paths for treatment 1 (low price equilibrium)
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Figure 5: Mean price paths for treatment 2 (high price equilibrium)
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Figure 6: Mean transaction rates by period. Solid lines indicate observed fraction of items
sold. Dashed lines indicate equilibrium predictions.
Treatment Rank-Sum Test t-test
1 2 p-value p-value
Transaction Rate 0.748 0.262 0.007937 0.000003
Table 2: Hypothesis tests for differences in transaction rates across treatments. The unit of
observation is one session for a total of 10 observations.
posted by uninformed sellers in treatment 2 are closely aligned with the prices posted by high
quality informed sellers. Table 3 presents hypothesis tests for pooling behavior under each
treatment condition. Both a non-parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank-sum test and a
parametric t-test find that the prices posted by uninformed sellers were significantly closer
to prices posted by low quality informed sellers in treatment 1 than in treatment 2. Both
tests also find that the prices posted by uninformed sellers were significantly closer to prices
posted by high quality informed sellers in treatment 2 than in treatment 1. These results
support the pooling behavior predicted by proposition 2 and proposition 3 respectively.
The empirical price paths shown in figure 4 and figure 5 exhibit remarkable similarity with
the theoretical predictions of the best response dynamics as illustrated by figure 1 and figure 2
respectively. In treatment 2, the mean posted price path for uninformed sellers and informed
high quality sellers lies in the equilibrium range [q̄, kq̄]. However, as predicted by the best
response dynamic, the mean posted price path for informed sellers and low quality sellers in
treatment 2 lies above the equilibrium range
[
q, kq
]
.
Result 2. Prices carried significant information about quality under both treatments.
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Treatment Rank-Sum Test t-test
1 2 p-value p-value
|PUninformed − PLowQuality| $0.74 $3.59 0.007937 0.00239
|PUninformed − PHighQuality| $3.88 $0.62 0.007937 0.00002
Table 3: Hypothesis tests regarding pooling behavior. The unit of observation is one session
for a total of 10 observations.
Informed Seller Type Rank-Sum Test t-test
Price High Quality Low Quality p-value p-value
Treatment 1 $10.10 $5.69 0.007937 0.000001
Treatment 2 $10.08 $5.88 0.007937 0.000065
Table 4: Hypothesis tests for differences in posted prices across seller types. The unit of
observation is the mean posted price in one session of one type of seller for a total of 10
observations.
Treatment Rank-Sum Test t-test
1 2 p-value p-value
Bargain Rate 0.4815 0.1715 0.01587 0.000997
Table 5: Hypothesis tests for differences in the proportion of bargains offered by uninformed
sellers across treatments. The unit of observation is one session for a total of 10 observations.
Table 4 presents hypothesis tests for differences in posted prices across item qualities. Non-
parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank-sum tests and parametric t-tests find that in-
formed high quality sellers posted significantly higher prices than informed low quality sell-
ers in both treatments. Consequently, uninformed buyers could make valid inferences about
item qualities based on the posted prices. Consistent with equilibrium predictions, both
treatments exhibited significant price signaling.
Figure 6 illustrates the mean transaction rates observed under each treatment. The vertical
axis indicates the mean fraction of items sold. The horizontal axis indicates periods ranging
from 1 to 100. The solid blue line indicates the mean fraction of items sold over all of
the sessions that implemented treatment 1. The solid red line indicates the mean fraction
of items sold under all sessions that implemented treatment 2. The dotted lines indicate
equilibrium predictions. In the first period, both treatments exhibited similar transaction
rates. In later periods, treatment 1 consistently exhibited higher transaction rates than
treatment 2.
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Figure 7: Proportion of uninformed sellers offering high quality items at prices less than the
seller’s own valuation for high quality items. Solid lines indicate observed fraction of items
sold. Dashed lines indicate equilibrium predictions.
Result 3. Observed transaction rates were significantly higher in treatment 1 than treatment
2.
Table 2 presents hypothesis tests for differences in the observed transaction rate across
experimental treatment conditions. Both a non-parametric Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon rank-
sum test and a parametric t-test find that the observed transaction rate in treatment 1 was
significantly higher than the observed transaction rate in treatment 2.
Figure 7 illustrates the proportion of uninformed sellers offering bargains in each treatment.
Uninformed sellers are said to offer bargains if their posted prices for a high quality item are
less than their own valuation for high quality items. The horizontal axis indicates periods
ranging from 1 to 100. Solid lines indicate proportion of uninformed sellers offering bargains
in a given period. The dotted lines indicate equilibrium predictions. In the first fifty periods,
this bargain rate was highly volatile. Over the last fifty periods, this bargain rate was
consistently higher in treatment 1 than in treatment 2.
Result 4. Significantly more bargains were available under treatment 1 than under treatment
2.
Table 5 presents hypothesis tests for differences in the proportion of uninformed sellers
offering bargains between experimental treatment conditions. Both a non-parametric Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon rank-sum test and a parametric t-test find that the fraction of uninformed
sellers offering bargains in treatment 1 was significantly higher than in treatment 2.
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Figure 8: Average posted prices and payoffs by seller type and treatment over all 100 periods.
The horizontal axis indicates posted prices and the vertical axis indicates payoffs. The green
line indicates the average payoff to each possible posted price. The solid gray line indicates
the mean posted price. The dotted gray lines indicate one standard deviation from the mean.
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Figure 8 illustrates the average posted prices and payoffs by seller type over all 100 periods
of each treatment. The left column illustrates the observed posted prices for each type of
seller under treatment 1. The right column illustrates the observed posted prices for each
type of seller under treatment 2. The horizontal axis indicates posted prices and the vertical
axis indicates payoffs. The green line indicates the average payoff to each possible posted
price. The solid gray line indicates the mean posted price. The dotted gray lines indicate
one standard deviation from the mean.
Under both treatments, the mean posted price for each type of seller is nearly optimal, in-
dicating that subjects responded to incentives. Yet posted prices also exhibit considerable
variance, suggesting the presence of individual heterogeneity or behavioral noise. To inves-
tigate individual level behavior we calculate the maximum likelihood estimates for the the
noisy best response model described in Section 2.6 where each subject exhibits a distinct
level of precision in her selection of optimal strategies and a distinct level of sensitivity to
payoff differences.
Figure 9 illustrates each subject’s maximum likelihood parameter estimates. Each point
indicates the parameters estimated for a single subject. The vertical axis illustrates a given
subject’s estimated level of sensitivity to payoff differences. The horizontal axis illustrates a
given subject’s tendency to select strategies near her best response. Some subjects exhibited
strong sensitivity to payoff differences but relatively little tendency to select strategies near
their best response. Other subjects exhibited a strong tendency to select strategies near
their best response but relatively weak sensitivity to payoff differences.
In the absence of behavioral noise, exact selection of a best response and exact payoff max-
imization are equivalent. However, in the presence of behavioral noise these two models
can make different predictions. For example, relatively flat payoff functions where the best
response is only slightly more profitable than other strategies will lead to greater variation
in behavior when a subjects is more likely to select strategies with higher payoffs and she
exhibits imperfect sensitivity to payoff differences. In contrast, if a subject is simply more
likely to select strategies near her best response, then even if she exhibits imperfect precision
in her strategy selection, the shape of the payoff function away from the best response does
not affect her behavior.
Result 5. Subjects exhibited heterogeneous payoff sensitivity and strategy precision.
Figure 10 illustrates the p-values for likelihood ratio tests for restrictions to a single source
of behavioral noise. Each point indicates the p-values obtained for a single subject. The
vertical axis displays the p-value for a test of the null hypothesis that imprecision in strategy
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Figure 10: Likelihood ratio test p-
values for restrictions to a single
source of behavioral noise. Each
point indicates the p-values obtained
for a single subject.
selection is the only source of noise in a given subject’s behavior. The horizontal axis displays
the p-value for a test of the null hypothesis that imperfect sensitivity to payoff differences
is the only source of noise in a given subject’s behavior. For many subjects we can reject
exactly one of these hypotheses at the 1% level, indicating that some subjects focused on
selecting strategies near their best response while others focused on selecting strategies with
relatively large payoffs.
6 Conclusion
Akerlof’s (1970) classic analysis of lemons markets assumes all sellers are informed and all
buyers are uninformed about the quality of goods for sale. In this paper, we consider a more
general environment in which some buyers are informed and some sellers are informed. In
this environment, we characterize two types of perfect Bayesian Nash equilibria in which
sellers endogenously set prices and buyers endogenously form beliefs.
Low price equilibria exhibit full trade while high price equilibria exhibit only partial trade.
Bargains are offered by uninformed sellers under low price equilibria but not under high price
equilibria. Prices serve as reliable signals of quality to uninformed buyers under both types
of equilibria. These theoretical predictions suggest Pareto efficient full trade, price signaling,
and bargains can all coexist in markets with asymmetric information.
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While subject behavior was largely consistent with the equilibrium pooling predictions, it
systematically deviated from equilibrium predictions about the transaction rate and the
bargain rate. Equilibrium predicts full trade in the first treatment but low levels of trade in
the second treatment. While the first treatment exhibited significantly higher transaction
rates, it remained significantly below the equilibrium predictions. Similarly, equilibrium
predicts that uninformed sellers will always offer bargains in our first treatment but will never
offer bargains in our second treatments. While the first treatment exhibited significantly
higher bargain rates, it remained significantly below equilibrium predictions.
We found that subjects exhibited two distinct types of behavioral noise in their selection
of strategies. Some subjects focused on selecting strategies near a best response, while
other subjects focused on selecting strategies with higher payoffs. These two methods of
optimization are indistinguishable in the absence of behavioral noise, since exact selection of
a best response is equivalent to exact payoff maximization. Only in the presence of behavioral
noise do these two methods yield distinct behavior.
In contrast with conventional adverse selection models, our results indicate that price can
serve as a reliable signal of quality in markets with asymmetric information. Casual obser-
vation suggests that consumers often try to infer product quality from prices. For instance,
when deciding on which wine to purchase, an uninformed consumer might use the price as
a proxy for quality. In our model, this arises because the presence of some informed buyers
can incentivize informed sellers to charge prices that reflect item quality, allowing the unin-
formed buyers to free ride on this price signal. Future research could generalize our model
to the case of continuous quality distributions and identify the degree to which our results
extend to naturally occurring markets with asymmetric information.
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A Proofs
Proof of proposition 1. If ρ (Ls) > ρ (Hs) then β (Hb, ρ (Ls)) = β (Lb, ρ (Ls)) = 1 since
E {q|Hb} = q̄ ≥ q = E {q|Lb}. But then the informed high quality seller could earn a
higher expected profit by mimicking the informed low quality seller. So we must have
ρ (Ls) ≤ ρ (Hs).
If β (Lb, ρ (Us)) = 0 and ρ (Ls) < ρ (Us) < ρ (Hs) then β (Ub, ρ (Hs)) = β (Hb, ρ (Hs)) = 1
since E {q|p = ρ (Hs)} = q̄. But then the uninformed seller could earn a higher expected
profit by mimicking the informed high quality seller.
If β (Lb, ρ (Us)) = 1 and ρ (Ls) < ρ (Us) < ρ (Hs) then β (Ub, ρ (Us)) = 1 since
E {q|Ub, p = ρ (Us)} ≥ E {q|Lb, p = ρ (Us)}. But then the low quality informed seller could
earn a higher expected profit by mimicking the uninformed seller.
If ρ (Us) < ρ (Ls) then β (Ub, ρ (Ls)) = β (Lb, ρ (Ls)) = 1 since E {q|p = ρ (Ls)} ≥ q. But
then the uninformed seller could earn a higher expected profit by mimicking the informed
low quality seller.
If ρ (Us) > ρ (Hs) and β (Ub, ρ (Us)) = 1 then β (Hb, ρ (Us)) = 1 since E {q|Hb} ≥ E {q|Ub}.
But then the informed high quality seller could earn a higher expected profit by mimicking
the uninformed seller.
If ρ (Us) > ρ (Hs) and β (Ub, ρ (Us)) = 0 then β (Lb, ρ (Us)) = 0 by the incentive compatibility
condition of the low type seller. Hence β (Hb, ρ (Us)) = 1 by the incentive compatibility
condition of the uninformed seller. So β (Ub, ρ (Hs)) = 1 by the incentive compatibility
condition of the informed high quality seller. Then by the uninformed seller’s incentive
compatibility condition we have
E {πs|Us, p = ρ (Us)} ≥ E {πs|Us, p = ρ (Hs)}
(1− θ) (1− γ) (ρ (Us)− q̄) ≥ (1− θ) (1− γ) (ρ (Hs)− q̄) + γ (ρ (Hs)− qU)
(1− θ) (1− γ) (ρ (Us)− q̄) > (1− θ) (1− γ) (ρ (Hs)− q̄) + γ (ρ (Hs)− q̄)
(1− θ) (1− γ) (ρ (Us)− q̄) > (1− θ − γ + θγ) (ρ (Hs)− q̄) + γ (ρ (Hs)− q̄)
(1− θ) (1− γ) (ρ (Us)− q̄) > (1− θ + θγ) (ρ (Hs)− q̄)
(1− θ) (1− γ) (ρ (Us)− q̄) > (1− θ) (ρ (Hs)− q̄)
(1− γ) (ρ (Us)− q̄) > ρ (Hs)− q̄
E {πs|Hs, p = ρ (Us)} > E {πs|Hs, p = ρ (Hs)}
But then the informed high quality seller could earn a higher expected profit by mimicking
the uninformed seller.
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Proof of proposition 2. The buyer’s belief µ is consistent along the path of play if
µ
(
q|p, Lb
)
= 1, µ
(
q|p,Hb
)
= 0, and
µ
(
q|p, Ub
)
=

1 if p > p̄
0 if p ∈ (p, p̄]
θ
θ+λ(1−θ) if p ≤ p
(36)
Then the buyer’s expected quality satisfies
q < Eµ
{
q|p, Ub
}
=
θq + λ (1− θ) q̄
θ + λ (1− θ)
< q̄ (37)
Hence β (tb, p) is optimal for all tb and p by (23) and (24). Then the seller’s expected payoff
is
E {πs|p̄, Ls} = γ
(
p̄− q
)
(38)
E
{
πs|p, Ls
}
= p− q (39)
E {πs|p̄, Hs} = p̄− q̄ (40)
E
{
πs|p,Hs
}
= p− q̄ (41)
E {πs|p̄, Us} = (1− θ) (1− γ) (p̄− q̄) + γ (p̄− qU) (42)
E
{
πs|p, Us
}
= p− qU (43)
Hence ρ (ts) is optimal for all ts by (25) and (26).
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Proof of proposition 3. The buyer’s belief µ is consistent along the path of play if
µ
(
q|p, Lb
)
= 1, µ
(
q|p,Hb
)
= 0, and
µ
(
q|p, Ub
)
=
 θλθλ+1−θ if p ∈ (p, p̄]1 otherwise (44)
Then the buyer’s expected quality satisfies
q < Eb {q|p̄, Ub} =
θλq + (1− θ) q̄
θλ+ 1− θ
< q̄ (45)
Hence β (tb, p) is optimal for all tb and p by (27), (28), and (29). Then the seller’s expected
payoff is
E {πs|p̄, Ls} = 0 (46)
E
{
πs|p, Ls
}
= p− q (47)
E {πs|p̄, Hs} = (1− γ) (p̄− q̄) (48)
E
{
πs|p,Hs
}
= p− q̄ (49)
E {πs|p̄, Us} = (1− θ) (1− γ) (p̄− q̄) (50)
E
{
πs|p, Us
}
= θ (1− γ)
(
p− q
)
+ γ
(
p− qU
)
(51)
+ (1− θ) (1− γ)
(
p− q̄
)
Hence ρ (ts) is optimal for all ts ∈ Ts by (27), (28), and (30).
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Proof of proposition 4. Let (ρ1, β1, µ1) be a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the in-
teraction between a single buyer and a single seller. Let (p, β) such that pi = ρ1(ti) and
βj = β1(tb, ·) for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , 3n}. Then the expected payoff to the seller in the two-agent
interaction is given by
E {πs|ts, p} =
∑
tb∈Tb
P (tb|ts) β0 (tb, p) (p− E {q|tb, ts}) (52)
=
1
P (ts)
∑
tb∈Tb
P (ts ∩ tb) β0 (tb, p) (p− E {q|tb, ts}) (53)
=
1
P (ts)
∑
tb∈Tb
∑
q∈Q
P (q ∩ ts ∩ tb) β0 (tb, p) (p− q) (54)
=
1
mP (ts)
∑
tb∈Tb
∑
q∈Q
φ (q, ts, tb) β0 (tb, p) (p− q) (55)
=
1
mnP (ts)
3n∑
j=1
∑
q∈Q
φ (q, ts, tb) βj (p) (p− q) (56)
Hence pi maximizes ui (p, β). Let Hj (p) denote the set of posted prices for offers to buyer
j under the price profile p. The expected payoff to the buyer in the market with multiple
buyers and sellers is given by
uj (p, β) =
3n∑
i=1
∑
q∈Q
φ (q, ti, tj) βj (pi) (kq − pi) (57)
=
3n∑
i=1
∑
q∈Q
φ (q, ti, tj) β0 (tj, pi) (kq − pi) (58)
= n
∑
ts∈Ts
∑
q∈Q
φ (q, ts, tj) β0 (tj, ρ0 (ts)) (kq − ρ0 (ts)) (59)
= mnP (tb = tj)
∑
p∈Hj(ρ)
(kEµ {q|tb = tj, p} − p) β0 (tj, p) (60)
Hence βj maximizes uj (p, β).
31
